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NOTES
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL: A PROPOSAL TO ADOPT THE
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION IN FLORIDA
INTRODUCrION

The economic welfare of most persons depends on gainful employment.
The right to work, therefore, is one of the most fundamental liberties recognized in American society.' An employee's job security depends on protection
from the employer's discretionary right to dismiss personnel.2 A principal
reason for expansion of labor unions in the United States was to protect employees from the employer's unbridled discharge power. 3 To guard against unjust dismissal, most collective bargaining agreements contain provisions permitting employers to dismiss personnel only if "just cause" 4 can be established.
Although most collective bargaining agreements do not entitle employees
to a full hearing before imposing disciplinary action, management decisions
discharging employees are reviewable in arbitration hearings.5 Grievance and
arbitration procedures permit employees to voice contract violation complaints
to both management and union officials. 6 During these proceedings, as in
OEditor's Note: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in summer 1982.
1. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J. dissenting);
F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951).
2. See generally Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
3. Id. at 1405.
4. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 612 (1973). "It is common [for
collective bargaining agreements] to include the right to suspend and discharge for 'just cause,'
'justifiable cause,' 'proper cause,' 'obvious cause,' or quite commonly simply for 'cause.' " Id.
(quoting Worthington Corp., 24 IAB. ARB. (BNA) 1, 6 (1955) (McGoldrick, Arb.)).
"Cause" has been held to exist if two criteria of reasonableness are met: (1) that it is
reasonable to discharge employees because of certain conduct; and (2) that the employee had
fair notice, express or fairly implied, that such conduct would be grounds for discharge.
Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1968). For specific offenses that constitute "just cause," see infra note 10.
5. In a 1978 Bureau of National Affairs report, 96% of the collective bargaining contracts
surveyed provided for discharge and discipline proceedings; however, only 17% of those
surveyed provided for predischarge hearings. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, 1978 SURVEY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAININc NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 63 [hereinafter cited as 1978 SURVEY]. For a
detailed discussion of grievance and arbitration proceedings, see Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: United States Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 434-35 (1964).
6. Courts construe union contracts as requiring satisfactory job performance and consider
poor job performance just cause for dismissal. Courts also imply a good faith standard to
evaluate the employer's reasons for dismissing an employee. All employees are entitled to
similar treatment for similar conduct. Thus, if the employer singled out one employee for
conduct that routinely has not been subject to discipline, the employee may allege unequal
treatment in a grievance proceeding. If the employer's disciplinary action was in bad faith,
without prior notice to all employees that such conduct would be sanctioned, the employee
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judicial proceedings, the employee mdy confront and cross-examine witnesses,
rebut the employer's evidence against him and present his own evidence. 7 The
employee may also refuse to testify against himself and may object to inadmissible evidence.8 At these hearings the appropriateness of the employer's
action is determined by examining the employee's past record.9 Union contract
provisions limit the offenses' 0 for which an employee may be disciplined and
place the burden of proving the employee's guilt on the employer." If the
arbitrator finds insufficient grounds for dismissal, remedies such as reinstatement and back pay may be awarded to the employee.12
While collective bargaining contracts provide employees with a high level
of protection against unjust dismissal, less than one-third of the American work
force is unionized. 3 Membership is low in part because many types of work do
not lend themselves to unionization. For instance, union organization has
been very unsuccessful among white collar, service sector and professional occupations.14 Additionally, continuing employee dissatisfaction with organized

may recover damages. See Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for

a Statute, 62 VA. L. Rxv. 481, 502-03 (1976).
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. In determining whether just cause for dismissal exists, many union contracts provide
that many offenses must accumulate before an employee is discharged. 1978 SURVEY, supra
note 5, at 64.
10. Offenses that often consitute just cause for discharge include unauthorized strikes,
intoxication, dishonesty, theft, failure to meet work standards, insubordination, unauthorized
absence, failure to obey safety rules, and misconduct. Id. at 63-64.
11. Arbitrators differ on whether the employer must prove just cause for dismissal
beyond a reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence. Generally, however, that
proof must be shown by more than mere "preponderance of the evidence." See Summers,
supra note 6, at 504.
12. See Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 434-35. According to the Bureau of National Affairs
report, 43%o of the contracts surveyed expressly entitled improperly discharged employees to
reinstatement with back pay. Of these provisions, 63% granted full back pay, 34% left the
amount awarded to the arbitrator's discretion, and 4% placed a limitation on the amount
awarded. In some instances, contracts required unemployment compensation or money
earned from other jobs to be deducted from back pay. See 1978 SuRVEY, supra note 5, at 66.
13. For a statistical analysis of union and at-will employees in the American work force,
see Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Onto ST.

L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979).
14. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816, 1837 n.109 (1980).

15. Employee discontentment with labor unions also stems from the degree of control
these powerful organizations have over their members. Generally, unions control the manner
and extent to which an individual grievance is presented. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 171
(1967). While labor organizations often effectively protect members from employers' contract
violations, unions sometimes compromise individuals' rights in the interest of attaining a
larger benefit for their collective body. See Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively
Discharged Employee, 26 HAStINGs LJ. 1435, 1444 (1975). Such action has been held not to

constitute bad faith union activity. 386 U.S. at 193. Union employees, however, usually must
exhaust arbitration channels before seeking judicial redress. See Note, supra at 1458. An employee unable to present his case before a grievance committee may be effectively foreclosed
from relief, despite union contract provisions specifying a remedy. Id. at 1459.
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has resulted in a steady decline in union membership. 16 Consequently,

two-thirds of the American work force are employed "at will," without contract protection for a specified employment duration, and remain subject to
7
employers' unbridled discharge power.'

Despite a marked imbalance between management and labor in at-will

employment relationships, employees not covered by collective bargaining
agreements enjoy limited protections. Congress has afforded safeguards to
particular classes of at-will employees by placing some restrictions on ems
ployers. For example, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA)'
prohibits an employer from dismissing an employee in retaliation for par19
ticipation or nonparticipation in a union organization. The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), a federal administrative agency created to investi20
gate and resolve employee claims, enforces the statute. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 also restricts the employer's discharge power by prohibiting
dismissal on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.21 Most
states, including Florida,22 have legislation closely tracking the federal Act,
while other states further extend employee protection.23 While legislation pro16. The percentage of union members in the American work force declined from almost
25% in 1970 to 22.3% in 1978, and 20.9% in 1980. U.S. Dept. Lab., Bull. No. 81-446, Bureau
of Lab. Statistics, Sept. 18, 1981, at 2.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 28-33.
18. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69 (1976)).
19. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1976). The National Labor Relations Act protects
federal civil service employees from discharge for union activity. See infra note 56. Many
states have passed similar statutes extending protection to state public and private employees.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 447.17 (1981).
20. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66, amended
by Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 8(a) & (b), 86 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-15 (1976)).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). Title VII, as amended in 1972, provides protection to both
public and private employees. For an extensive discussion of Title VII, see Note, Title VII
Employment Discrimination: Criteria for the Judicious Use of Affirmative Action, 32 U. FLA.
L. REv. 731 (1980). Title VII does not protect against age discrimination in employment. To
protect older workers, Congress enacted the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). See Note, Compensatory and Punitive
Damages in Age Discrimination in Employment, 32 U. FLA. L. Rav. 701 (1980).
22. FLA. STAT. § 110.105(2) (1981) provides:
All appointments, terminations ... and other terms and conditions of employment in
state government shall be made without regard to age, sex, race, religion, national
origin, political affiliation, marital status or handicap, except when a specific sex, age
or physical requirement constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification necessary to
proper and efficient administration.
23. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 296.020 (Vernon Supp. 1982), which makes it unlawful for
an employer, employment agency or labor union to discriminate or tend to discriminate on
the basis of "race, creed, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry or handicap." Id. The
District of Columbia has extended its protection even further. D.C. CODE § 6-2221 (Supp.
1978) makes it unlawful for an employer, employment agency or labor union to discriminate,
either "wholly or partially" on basis of "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital
status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, physical handicap,
matriculation or political affiliation." Id.
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vides employees with limited protection from unjust dismissal, 24 employers are
free to discharge employees for any reason outside the statutory restrictions.
The common law employment-at-will doctrine allows any employee under
a contract of unspecified duration to be discharged at any time without cause
or notice, and with no danger of liability to the employer.25 The employer
may dismiss at will under common law, regardless of the employee's length of
service 8 or quality of performance. 27 Courts therefore view employees hired
for "permanent" or "lifetime" posidons 28 as mere at-will employees and withhold judicial relief for retaliatory or unjust discharge.
Despite its apparent harshness, the doctrine has been justified by the
mutuality of obligation principle.29 Because the at-will employee may freely
dissolve the employment relationship at any time without notice to the employer, the mutuality principle requires that the employer have a correlative
right to termiiation. 30 Absent additional consideration 3 beyond the employee's
agreement to perform services for pay, courts have been reluctant to impose
liability on employers for exercising their common law right to dismiss. 2 As a
result, the employee has no right to continued employment and no remedy for
arbitrary discharge. 82
24. Other specialized laws have, also been passed which proscribe employee dismissals
under certain circumstances. For example, an employer may not discharge an employee whose
wages have been garnished because of one indebtedness. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976). Military veterans, upon release from service, are entitled to return to
their former civilian jobs and may not be discharged for one year, unless just cause can be
shown. See 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1976). Public employees are also safeguarded from arbitrary
dismissal under federal and state civil service regulations. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a) (1976).
25. The origin of the employment-at-will rule has generallybeen associated with Horace
Gray Wood, who set forth the rule in his treatise on the law of master and servant. H. WooD,
MASTER AND SERVANT iii(1877). Since then, "Wood's Rule" has been adopted throughout the
United States. See 9 S. WILLISTON, WMLISTON

ON

CoNTRAcrs

§

1017 (1967).

26. See Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (plaintiff discharged one
year before retirement, after 45 years of service to his employer, for allegedly engaging in
conduct unbecoming an Armour management employee; court held contract was terminable
at the will of either party).
27. See Odum v. Bush, 125 Ga. 184, 53 S.E. 1013 (1906) (plaintiff, an expert coffinmaker,
was persuaded to accept employment at a rival company; after plaintiff developed the company, he was dismissed without cause; court held employee was merely hired at will).
28. See, e.g., Horizon Corp. v. Weinberg, 23 Ariz. App. 215, 531, P.2d 1153 (1975) (employee who accepted permanent position as a financial analyst was merely employed at will).
See also Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 107, 117-23
(1942).
29. See Comment, Employment At Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV.
211, 218-28 (1973) (discussion of mutuality of obligation and the problem of sufficient con-

sideration).
30. See 9 S.WmLrON, supra note 25, § 1017, at 129 n.11; J.
LAW

OF

CONTRAmCS

§ 4-14

CAiAs

mu

& J.PERiLLo, THE

(1977).

31. Consideration is a legal detriment that has been bargained for and exchanged for a
promise. J. CALAMARI : J. PERILLo, supra note 30, § 4-1.
32. See, e.g., Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Iowa 1961) (employee who
gave no additional consideration beyond accepting offer of permanent employment had only

an at-will contract).
33. See, e.g., Edwards v. Kentucky Util. Co., 286 Ky. 341,.150 S.W.2d 916 (1941) (employee
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This note examines the origins and current status of the employment at-will
doctrine. It discusses the development of the public policy exception adopted
by a majority of states, which provides employees with a tort action against
employers if the reason for discharge violates an established public policy.34
Florida's rejection of the public policy exception receives particular emphasis
and analysis. Based on the criteria used by other jurisdictions, 5 the note suggests adoption of the public policy limitation in Florida when employees demonstrate their dismissal transgressed an articulated legislative policy.
DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL

The employment-at-will doctrineso was formulated in the nineteenth century3 7 when the United States was experiencing rapid economic growth. 3 To

enable employers to fill newly-created jobs in an emerging industrial society,
courts embraced a laissez-faire attitude39 toward employment relationships.
Employers had broad discretion to hire and fire employees, without fear of
legal repercussions. 40 Despite this protectionist attitude toward employers,
courts considered management and labor in equal bargaining positions.41 Due
to labor scarcity, employers were reasonably assured employees could find
work elsewhere after being discharged. The rule also appeared advantageous
to employees, who were free to attain advancement by changing jobs at will.
During this period of economic growth, employers enjoyed a freedom of con42
tract that evolved into an absolute discharge power.
In 1908, the employer's right to terminate employment was given constitutional protection in Adair v. United States. 43 The case involved an interstate
carrier's employee who was discharged because of his membership in a labor
organization. 44 The United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
federal statute protecting the employees' right to unionize. 45 The majority
who had relinquished his job to accept an offer of permanent employment did not show
sufficient additional consideration to bind employer to his promise).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 92-118.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 163-66.
36. For a discussion of the at-will doctrine's origin, see Feinman, The Development of
the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 42 & 43.
38. See Feinman, supra note 36.
39. See generally Comment, Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 BUFFALO L.
Rav. 1081 (1973). Laissez-faire economic policy promoted free competition and discouraged
government interference. The theory's premise presumed that since parties to an employment
contract had equal bargaining powers, no need existed to bind either party to the relationship. Id. at 1083.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 44-49.
41. See Comment, supra note 39, at 1083-85.
42. See, e.g., Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 401 (1884) (court upheld railroad's
dismissal of employee without notice, because employee had no contract for fixed term),
overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
43. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
44. Id. at 170.
45. Id. at 180. Section 10 of the Congressional Act of June 1, 1898, 30 Stat. L. 424, ch.
370, 1901 U.S. Comp. Stat. 3205, prohibited employers from discriminating against any em-
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reasoned the statute imposed an unreasonable restraint on the employer's fifth
amendment right to enter into and to terminate an employment relationship. 41
Emphasizing the underlying notion of contractual freedom, the Court stated
because an employee was entitled to offer his labor under certain terms, the
employer had a similar right to prescribe the conditions under which he would
accept the labor. 47 The Court also declared the fifth amendment protected the
employer's property interest in the employment relationship and ruled the
statute an invasion of that property right.4s
Justice Holmes dissented in Adair and laid the foundation for a public
policy exception4 9 to the employment-at-will rule by expressing concern that
the majority provided employers with oppressive authority.5 0 Justice Holmes
viewed the policy of preventing strikes through union organization as a legitimate congressional objective enforceable through legislation.51 Since an important public policy was at issue, he reasoned the Constitution should not
forbid government from placing reasonable limitations on employers' other52
wise absolute discharge power.
Adair and its progeny 53 represent the pinnacle of judicial support for
laissez-faire capitalism in the employment area. As industrialization continued
to flourish, however, the need to modify employers' unfettered control became
evident. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,54 the Supreme Court disployee because of membership in a labor corporation, association, or organization. 208 U.S. at
180.

46. 208 U.S. at 172. The Court stated the Act regulating interstate carriers could only be
upheld if the legislation showed a substantial relation between an employee's membership in
a labor organization and interstate commerce. In striking down the Act, the majority declared
labor unions were organized to improve individual employees' working conditions, but had
no effect on interstate commerce. An employee of an interstate carrier would faithfully perform his duty, regardless of union affilliation. Id. at 178.
47. Id. at 174.
48. Id. at 180. In Adair, the Court recognized the employer's property right in the employment relationship. For a discussion of the employee's property right in employment, see
Comment, supra note 39.
49. 208 U.S. at 191. In his dissent, Holmes stated:
Where there is... an important ground of public policy for restraint, the Constitution
does not forbid it .

. .

. It cannot be doubted that to prevent strikes, .

deemed by Congress an important point of policy, and
tion would help a good deal to carry its policy along.

. . .

.

. might be

that the provision in ques-

50. Id. at 190 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
51. ld. Stating Congress had authority to enact legislation restraining employers, Justice
Holmes emphasized that a substantial relation between employees' union membership and
interstate commerce existed. His dissent argued unions exercised direct influence on both the
terms of labor employment and on business operations. Id.
52. Id. at 191. Unlike the majority, Holmes viewed the legislation as a reasonable and
very limited interference with freedom of contract. "[The Act] does not require the carriers
to employ any one. It does not forbid them to refuse to employ any one . .. . The section
simply prohibits the more powerful party to exact certain undertakings, or to threaten dismissal or unjustly discriminate on certain grounds against those already employed." Id..
53. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking a Kansas law that prohibited
employers from conditioning employment on employees' promises of non-union membership).
.

4

301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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regarded precedent and ruled in favor of employees. Through the NLRB,
steelworkers brought suit against their employer for engaging in discriminatory
labor practices by dismissing them solely because of union membership. 55 The
employees claimed the employer violated the NLRA, which protected employees' rights to unionize free from employers' interference or intimidation. 5
The employer responded by asserting the common law right to conduct business without arbitrary restraints.57 In upholding the NLRA, the Court stated
employees have the right to negotiate work conditions with their employers
and to seek redress of grievances through unionization.58 The Court reasoned
the Act did not interfere with employers' right to select or discharge employees.
The Act only precluded employers from using dismissal as a means of intimidating employees from engaging in union activity.59
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, for the first time a majority of the Court examined employment contract rights from a public policy standpoint. 60 The
case arose when the nation was recovering from economic depression and
anticipating war in Europe. Steel production was a major industry, and Jones
8c Laughlin was the nation's fourth largest steel producer. 61 In reaching its
decision, the Court emphasized that labor problems would cripple steel manufacturing.6 2 Based on the public interest in maintaining the free flow of com55. Id. at 22. Initially, members of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin
Workers of America charged their employer with engaging in unfair labor practices in an
NLRB proceeding. Ruling for the employees, the NLRB ordered the corporate employer to
stop discriminating, and to offer its employees reinstatement with back pay. The NLRB
order required the employer to post notices indicating the corporation would not discharge
or discriminate against employees for union affiliation. After the employer failed to comply,
the NLRB petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the order. The court refused
because the NLRB's order overstepped the boundaries of federal power. Id.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). The National Labor Relations Act provides: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
57. 301 U.S. at 43.
58. Id. at 44.
59. Id. at 45.
60. Although Justice Holmes in Adair and Justice Day in Coppage both looked to public
policy as support for upholding legislation restricting employers' freedom of contract, these
were dissenting opinions. Jones & Laughlin Steel was the first majority analysis of public
policy to uphold legislation limiting employers' dismissal rights.
The NLRA provides:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See also Peck, Judicial Creativity and State Labor Law, 40 WASH. L.
REv. 743 (1965) (examines public policy behind development of laws protecting union employees).
61. 301 U.S. at 26.
62. Id. at 42. Jones and Laughlin shipped approximately 75% of its steel through inter.
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merce, the Court ruled the legislature could limit the employer's common law

discharge power in this instance.63
CurrentStatus of the
At-Will Doctrine
The terminable at-will doctrine was devised to meet the industrial revolution's economic demands. In the modern employment relationship the common
law doctrine is inequitable for at-will employees. Piecemeal legislative enactments stemming from the influence of strong special interest groups, such as
the labor and civil rights movements, 64 have diluted but not eliminated the
rule."- Further statutory reform of at-will employment seems doubtful without
a cohesive lobbying effort that unorganized employees are unlikely to mount.66
Absent statutory impetus for abolishing employers' unrestrained discharge
power, courts have adhered to the at-will doctrine under the assumption the
parties themselves are able to negotiate the best bargain.86 Such an assumption,
however, ignores contemporary economic conditions in which the relative
bargaining powers of parties are so imbalanced that traditional contract
theories no longer apply.86 Few employees are in a position to demand a written contract for a fixed term when faced with competition from an abundant
labor supply.69 Employees generally must accept work under the terms offered
or seek other employment70
During the last several decades job mobility decreased.71 Unlike nineteenth
century wage earners, workers today face a slowly growing and unsteady economy.7 2 Modem employees are not guaranteed other employment will be available in the event of discharge. Changing jobs is risky for an employee whose
livelihood depends on the ability to maintain a steady income.73 Consequently,
state commerce. Realizing that a strike would halt steel production, the court resolved the
labor dispute in favor of the employees. Id. at 27.
63. Id. at 30-33.
64. See Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48
L. REv. 265, 281-85 (1963) (Lobbies and pressure groups play an important role in

MINN.

the legislative process. The scope of their activity is not confined to initiating legislation, but
extends to opposition of legislation disfavoring their interests).
65. See supranote'24 and text accompanying notes 18-24.
66. See Blades, supra note 2, at 1434 &n.141. See also Peck, supra note 13, at 3 (employees
not organized by a labor union lack the unity of purpose and effort that produce a successful
lobby); Note, supra note 14, at 1838 (unions are unlikely to support legislation protecting
at-will employees since protection from unjust dismissal is available only under collective
bargaining agreements).
67. See Note, supra note 15, at 1442.
68. Id. at 1443.
69. In 1980, the 'United States' average unemployment rate was 7.1%. Florida's unemployment rate was 6%. BuREAu OF ECON. & Bus.
ABSTRACr 1981, Table 25.01 at 639 (1981).

RESEARCH,

UNiv.

oF FLA., FLORIDA STATISTICAL

70. See Note, supra note 14, at 1828.
71. See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Rxv. 335, 338 & n.32
(1974) (the problem with mobility rates occurs among older workers who enjoy far less job
mobility than younger workers).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 38 & 89.
73. See Blades, supra note 2, at 1405-06 ("It is the fear of being discharged which above
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employees are more stationary and expect fair treatment in the employment
relationship.74 To encourage loyal service and job stability, employers implement seniority programs and provide retirement benefits for employees. 75
These management policies contribute to the lack of job mobility.76
This changed employment situation prompted judicial exceptions to the
at-will rule. For example, some courts apply contract principles to employmentat-will cases. In instances where lifetime jobs had been promised, dismissal
without cause constitutes a breach of an implied contract of permanent employment.77 Courts utilizing contract theory as a basis for exception, however,
encounter problems establishing sufficient consideration to bind the employer
to his promise.7s In these cases, courts examine the employment circumstances
searching for consideration beyond the employee's services to distinguish an
implied contract of permanent employment from an at-will contract. Sufficient
consideration has been found in the employee's length of service,79 contribution to the employer's business, 0 and detrimental reliance, such as a longdistance move or change of position.81 One or more of these factors allow an
inference that the employee reasonably expected job stability for a specific
duration.8 2
Other courts interject an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 3
all else renders the great majority of employees vulnerable to employer coercion."). See also
Note, supra note 14, at 1833-34. Arbitrary dismissals have detrimental repercussions. An employee's job loss, for example, may result in dislocation, which involves the costs of a new
job search, moving expenses and relocating the employee's family. Id.
74. See Note, supra note 15, at 1445.
75. Id.
76. See Note, supra note 71, at 339 (seniority benefits, which are a type of deferred compensation, serve as strong incentives for binding workers to their jobs).
77. Id. at 351-52.
78. See Blades, supra note 2, at 1421 ("[I1t is not policy but the technical difficulty of
relaxing the rather rigid rules of consideration which makes it unlikely that the employer's
right to terminate the at-will employment relationship can be limited under contract law.").
But see Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981)
("A single and undivided consideration may be bargained for and given as the agreed
equivalent of one promise or of two promises or of many promises.") (citing I CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 125 at 535-36 (1963)).
79. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 325, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr, 917, 919 (1981)
(employee dismissed after 32 years of service demonstrated sufficient additional consideration
to bind employer to implied promise not to arbitrarily dismiss employee).
80. See Bussard v. College of Saint Thomas, Inc., 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972)
(employee who gave a gift of magazine stock to employer in return for permanent position as
magazine publisher showed sufficient consideration to distinguish his employment from an
at-will relationship).
81. See Note, supra note 71, at 355 (some courts held that an employee gives consideration by uprooting his family and moving long distances to accept a job). But see Buian v.
J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970) (employee who accepted offer of an eighteenmonth position in Saudi Arabia had only an expectation of a fixed contract; since employer
paid employee's moving expenses, employee did not show additional consideration to prevent
employer from dismissing him after one month).
82. See Note, supra note 73, at 350-58.
83. This concept of good faith and fair dealing approximates the obligation of good
faith contained in U.C.C. § 1-2053 (1978). According to this provision, every contract or duty
within the Code imposes a good faith obligation in performance or enforcement. Id.
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in at-will employment contracts. This broad standard requires good faith dealing between parties to a commercial transaction.8 4 Courts utilizing this theory
strive to balance the employer's right to run his business in an efficient and
profitable manner.with the employee's interest in maintaining a steady source
of income.85 The balance is struck by recognizing a cause of action against employers who discharge employees in retaliation or bad faith. 6
While these approaches portend judicial modification of the at-will doctrine, few courts accept the implied contract and good faith exceptions.3 7 Due
to the difficulty of relaxing rigid consideration requirements, courts are reluctant to create a contractual cause of action.88 Even where courts afford employees these protections, employers can circumvent contractual exceptions by
conditioning employment on workers' disclaiming any right to sue for wrongful discharge.89
In the event employees could overcome consideration and disclaimer problems, these contractual exceptions pose even greater problems for courts. Since
a plaintiff's cause of action does not depend on showing the dismissal violated
a public concern, employees may sue for unjust dismissal based on interference
with a purely private interest1 o Courts therefore urge creating an exception
that avoids the consideration and disclaimer problems, and also discourages
incessant litigation.91
THE PUBLiC POLICY EXCEPTION
In response to criticism of the terminable-at-will doctrine, most states
See Vernon & Gray, Termination At Will -The Employer's Right to Fire, 6 EML.J. 25, 35-37 (1980); Note, A Remedy for Malicious Discharge of the At-Will
Employee: Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 7 CONN. L. REv. 758 (1975). The leading good faith
84.

PLOYEE REL.

and fair dealing limitation case was Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549
(1974). The court held an at-will employee's termination was not in the state's best economic
interest or the public good if the termination was motivated by bad faith or retaliation. Such
a termination constituted an employment contract breach. Id. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551.
85. 114 N.H. at 132, 316 A.2d at 551.
86. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)
(discharged employee, after 18 years of satisfactory service, stated a cause of action for breach
of contract against employer who dismissed him without cause and thereby deprived employee's accrued seniority benefits); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364
N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (salesman brought suit against former employer for bonuses allegedly
due from sales employer made prior to dismissal, and the court held employer's attempt to
withhold employee's commission constituted bad faith).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91.
88.

See supranote 78.

89. See Note, supra note 15, at 1454-55 (one shortcoming of using contract principle to
restrict discharge power is that employers may preserve that power by prompting employees
to expressly waive rights).
90. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (employee stated
valid action against employer who dismissed her after she refused to date the company foreman).
91. See Note, supra note 15, at 1454. Courts basing wrongful discharge actions on tort
principles rather than contract theory grant employees relief regardless of express waivers
contained in their employment contract. Courts usiig a tort exception, nevertheless, could
restrict wrongful discharge claims to only those that violate public policy. See infra text accompanying notes 92-121.
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adopted a tort exception to the rule founded on public policy considerations.
The California case of Petermann v. Teamsters Local 39692 first enunciated
this exception by allowing an employee to sue his employer for an intentional
tort of wrongful discharge, if the reason for dismissal contravened public
policy. 93 In Petermann, the plaintiff claimed he was wrongfully discharged by
the Teamsters Union for refusing to perjure 94 himself before a legislative committee investigating union wrongdoing.95 While acknowledging the traditional
right to terminate an at-will relationship, the court stated the employer's right
to dismiss may be limited by either statute or public policy considerations.96
The court granted relief to the discharged employee, because society's interest
in obtaining truthful testimony outweighed the employer's private right to
dismiss.9 Denying the employee a legal remedy would permit the employer to
98
commit an act specifically prohibited by state law.
Generally, courts utilizing the public policy exception limit its application
to situations where statutes express a clear mandate against a particular discharge, but provide no corresponding remedy. 99 In Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co., 00 for example, the plaintiff employee was dismissed for
filing a workers' compensation claim. 1 1 The state statute provided the employee with the right to collect workers' compensation and expressly prohibited the employer from disavowing that obligation.10 2 The Indiana Supreme
Court declared the public policy underlying the legislation shifted the economic burden for employment-connected injuries from the employee to the
employer. 0 3 To effectuate that policy, the employee must be able to exercise
her right without fear of jeopardizing her job. Accordingly, the court held the
employer's act constituted a retaliatory discharge10 4 entitling the employee to
92.

174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).

93. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. For an overview of the public policy exception, see Note,
Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REv. 153, 155-58 (1981); see
also Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle": A
Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 777, 786-99.
94. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. Under the state penal code, perjury was a
punishable offense. Although the state statute was not employment related, the court ruled
the state's public policy against perjury permeated the employment relationship and protected
the employee from dismissal. See Comment, supra note 93, at 787.

95. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 187, 3,4 P.2d at 26.
96. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Comment, supra note 93, at 787.

100. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1974).
101. Id. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 426.
102. Id. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 427-28. The court cited to the state statute: "No contract
or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation or other device shall, in any manner,
operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this act." Id.
citing IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1215 (1965). The court further noted: "The Act creates a duty in
the employer to compensate employees for work-related injuries (through insurance) and a
right in the employee to receive such compensation." (emphasis by court). 260 Ind. at 251,
297 N.E.2d at 427.
103. 260 Ind. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
104. The Frampton court analogized retaliatory employment discharge to retaliatory
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relief. Because the statute provided no specific remedy, the court implied the
right to recover damages'0s
The exception is occasionally utilized when the discharge violates public
106
policy but no statute expressly prohibits the dismissal. In Nees v. Hock,"10
the plaintiff was fired for willingly serving jury duty despite her employer's
demand that she request to be excused."'1 The Oregon Supreme Court ruled
the employee's refusal to follow her employer's order did not warrant dismissal.109 The court emphasized that in some instances an employer's reason
for discharging an at-will employee could jeopardize important public interests. 1 0 Although no legislation expressly prohibited the employee's discharge,
the court noted jury duty statutes manifest the public's interest in jury trials."'
The Nees court required the employer to compensate the employee for infringing upon her duty to participate in the jury system."12 The court distinguished between discharges violating important societal interests and those
merely interfering with the employee's personal concerns. For the public
policy exception to apply, the dismissal must involve more than a private intereit.2 3 The employee must establish a nexus between the discharge and a significant community interest in an established public policy."14 The Nees court
emphasized that jury duty, one of American citizens' foremost obligations,
necessitated protection under the public policy exception."

Since its introduction, the public policy exception has been expanded to
grant employees recovery for wrongful discharge in a variety of contexts. The
exception applied, for example, where an employee was fired for refusing a
polygraph test." 6 Because a state statute prohibited employers from conditionevictions in landlord-tenant relationships. Id. at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428. Edwards v. Habib,
5397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969), held that while landlords
could evict a tenant for any legal reason or for no reason at all, they could not evict a tenant
in retaliation for a tenant's report of housing code violations to the authorities. Permitting
landlords to evict tenants in retaliation would contravene public policy, which entitled
tenants to inform authorities of legal violations. Id. at 699.
105. 260 Ind. at 253, 297 N.E. at 428. Although state workers' compensation statutes entitled employees to recover for work-related injuries, the statutes did not provide specific

remedies for employer violations. The court, therefore, held that the discharged employee
was entitled full compensation. Id.
106. See Comment; supra note 93, at 793-99.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
Id. at 212, 536 P.2d at 513.
Id. at 218, 536 P.2d at 516.
Id.
Id.

112. Id. The court awarded the employee compensatory damages because jury service is
a substantial societal interest. But the court did not allow the employee's claim for punitive
damages, since the employers did not know at the time of discharge their actions were improper. Id. at 516-17.
113. Id. at 515. See also Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981) (a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and
responsibilities before a tort action will be allowed).
114. 272 Or. at 220, 536 P.2dat 516.
115. Id. The court emphasized that permitting an employer to discharge an employee for
fulfilling her jury duty obligation would thwart the community's will. Id.
116. See Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979). In Perks, an
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ing employment on such tests, the discharge violated public policy. 117 Similarly,
public policies supported private causes of action in cases of dismissal for
claiming pension benefits-, and for refusing to follow employers' instructions
to participate in wrongdoing.:" 9
Florida'sPosition
Despite the trend toward adoption of the public policy limitation, Florida
remains one of three jurisdictions20 strictly adhering to the common law
terminable-at-will rule. In Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 21 former airline
employees brought a tort action claiming their discharge violated the state's
public policy protecting the right to work. 22 According to the plaintiffs, this
legislative policy was articulated in a state statute that declared, "[t]he working
man, unionist or nonunionist, must be protected. The right to work is the
right to live."123 The right to work provision, however, was designed to prevent
labor organizations from coercing employees into becoming union members. 124
employee was asked to take a polygraph test to prove he had not violated company policy by
accepting gratuities from a company supplier. The employee refused the examination and was
discharged one week later.
117. Id. at 1365. The Pennsylvania statute provided: "A person is guilty of a misdemeanor
of the second degree if he requires as a condition for employment or continuation of employment that an employee . . . take a polygraph test or any form of . . . lie detector test."
Id. citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321(a) (Purdon 1973).
118. See Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (employer held
liable for intentionally dismissing employee, who provided 14 years of service, to prevent
employee from acquiring pension rights). See also Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
119. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d
1330 (1980) (employee fired because he refused to illegally fix retail gasoline prices stated
cause of action against employer for wrongful discharge). See also Olsen, Wrongful Discharge
Claims Raised by At Will Employees: A New Legal Concern for Employers, 32 LAB. L.J. 265,
285-89 (1981) (discussing application of public policy exception in whistleblower cases, where
employee is discharged for not engaging in unlawful business activities).
120. More than thirty states adopted or expressed a willingness to adopt the public
policy exception. Florida, Alabama and the District of Columbia are the only jurisdictions
expressly rejecting the exception. See Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala.
1977); Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. App. 1981). The remaining
states either have not ruled on the public policy exception, or have imposed contractual
limitations on employees' discharge power.
121. 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980).
122. FSA. STAT. § 447.01 (1981) provides:
(1) Because of the activities of labor unions affecting the economic conditions of the
country and the state . . . it is the sense of the Legislature that such organizations
affect the public interest and are charged with a public use. The working man, unionist or nonunionist, must be protected. The right to work is the right to live.
(2) It is here now declared to be the policy of the state ... to regulate the activities
and affairs of labor unions ....
123. Id.
124. See Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 1950). See generally
Blumrosen, Common Law Limitations on Employer Anti-Union Conduct: Protection of
Employee Interest in Union Activity by Tort Law, 54 Nw. L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1959) (examines
state right to work laws).
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The court emphasized the statute was not intended to be a catch all provision
for ensuring job stability.125 Acknowledging courts in other jurisdictions
2 6

granted employees relief if public policy violations were shown,.

the Third

District Court of Appeal nevertheless expressly refused to create an exception
to the terminable-at-will doctrine in Florida.'

2

7

The court reasoned not every

violation of public policy was a tort in absence of an allegation that the act
breached the plaintiffs' legal rights and caused injury to their person, property
28

or reputation.1

The employees further claimed that requiring employers to demonstrate
valid grounds for an employee's discharge would not be unduly restrictive.
Imposing such a requirement would merely provide a closer balance of power
between the parties.:ss The Catania court stated the employees' case was inappropriate for an extension of the law since the suit was founded on the

employer's bad motives. 30 The court refused to analyze the employer's intent
13
because the discharge itself was legal and did not violate any employee rights.
The Third District Court of Appeal reached a similar result in DeMarco v.

Publix Super Markets, Inc.,5

2

despite an employee's attempt to implement the
public policy exception based on a specific constitutional ground.133 In
DeMarco, a supermarket employee alleged he was wrongfully discharged for
bringing suit against his employer on behalf of his two-year-old daughter for
2
injuries she sustained while in the store.

4

The child had been shopping with

her mother when a glass container exploded, causing glass fragments to lodge
in the child's eye and resulting in permanent damage. After notification he
125. 381 So. 2d at 267. See infra text accompanying note 128.
126. 381 So. 2d at 267.
127. Id. The court expressly refused to be a "law giver" in this case, indicating the
Florida judiciary's intention to reject the public policy exception absent legislative authorization.
128. Id. Refusing to adopt the public policy exception, the court took a position similar
to entitlement cases involving public employment. Under the entitlement concept, persons
fired for no reason have no right to minimum due process, in the form of a hearing, unless
they demonstrate an injury other than their harmed reputation. Only persons showing
deprivation of a liberty or property interest may assert job entitlement. For example, in
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), a teacher fully completed his one-year contract, but was not rehired. The state university gave no reason 'for the dismissal. Id. at
566-68. The Supreme Court stated unless the teacher proved the school dismissed him for
exercising a specific constitutional right, no liberty interest was jeopardized. Id. at 569. The
Court further declared that the teacher had no tenure and, thus, no property right entitling a hearing because the school hired under a one-year contract. Id. at 578.
The Catania decision involved private employment; however, the court's rationale was
akin to that expressed in Roth. The Catania court required the employees to show their employerviolated a legal right that provided for continued employment as a prerequisite to a
cause of action. 381 So. 2d at 267.
129. 381-So. 2d at 266.
130. Id.
131. Id.
182. 860 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1978).
183. Ide. at 136. The employee brought suit under FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21: "The Courts
shall be open t6 every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial or delay."

134. 360 So. 2d at 135.
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would be dismissed unless he withdrew the suit, the plaintiff refused and was
discharged.135 In the later action for wrongful discharge, the employee claimed
the employer's ultimatum interfered with his constitutional right to court
access for redress of an injury.13s Adhering to the terminable-at-will rule, the
court held an employer could terminate an employee for any reason without
incurring liability.'3' In refusing to recognize a cause of action, the court subordinated a state constitutional provision to the common law rule.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court1 38 also rejected the employee's claim
that he was entitled to bring suit for Publix's violation of his constitutional
right.13 9 The dissent, however, distinguished the DeMarco suit, which was
filed on a third person's behalf, from a suit filed on the employee's own behalf.140 The dissent conceded that discharging an at-will employee because he

refused to withdraw the lawsuit might have been justified had the employee
sued in his own right.'4 ' A cause of action for interference existed, however,
when the employer used the at-will rule to interfere with a third party's right
1

to court access.

42

By taking a strict doctrinal approach, Florida courts ignore the need for
increased employee protection due to the state's economic conditions. During
the last decade, Florida's population growth rate was the third fastest of any
state in the country.'4 3 Job opportunities, generated by greater demand for
goods and services,1 44 swelled the labor supply.' 45 The state's employment
growth, however, has had little effect on employees' individual bargaining
power.146 The labor market largely consists of trade
135.

47

and service sectors1 4 8 to

Id. The employee rejected an offer from the employer's insurance company to settle

the claim for $200. Id.
136. See supra note 133.
137. 360 So. 2d at 136.
138. 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980).
139. Id.at 1254.
140. Id.(Overton, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id.at 1254. The dissent relied on Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So.
451 (1926), which stated, "the right of access and due process provisions secure individual
rights against unconstitutional invasion by the state, and from violation by other governmental agencies and individuals." Id. at 1255 (emphasis in original).
143. See ECONOMIc REPORT REP. OF THE GOVERNOR, 1981 ECONOMic FoRECSAST 9.
144. Id.
145.

Id. at 1.

146. Recent statistics concerning minimum wage violations illustrate Floridians' vulnerability in employment relationships. Florida currently employs four percent of the country's
work force; yet, Florida employers account for 8%, $2,000,000, of total back pay owed in the
United States. Telephone conven;ation with Dick Robinette, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage and

Hour Division, Regional Office, Atlanta, Ga. (Mar. 10, 1982).
147.

Hardware, food, auto dealership, apparel, furniture and restaurant industries priFLA. DEP'T OF COMMERCE REP., Div. OF ECON. DEy.,

marily comprise Florida's trade sector. See

AN ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA ECONOMY AS IT PERTAINS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Table XI-I

(1979).
148. Florida's service sector includes medical and other health services, private household
services, hotels, miscellaneous business services, amusement and recreation, auto repair, motion
picture and museums. Id. at XI-3.
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accommodate Florida's tourist industry. Manufacturing accounts for only a
small portion of total employment.1 49 Due to competition from a growing pool
of available labor, the overwhelming majority of workers lack bargaining
strength to ensure their own job security. Only about ten percent of the labor
force has unionized.150 Florida employers, therefore, retain absolute dominion
over most employees.
The Florida judiciary regarded increase of at-will employees as a strong
factor militating against adoption of the public policy exception. Fearful of
creating a flood of unwarranted litigation, courts sought to avoid claims of
unjust dismissal from disgruntled at-will employees. 151 Courts were also reluctant to upset employers' contractual freedom on the vague notion of public
policy. 15 2 Violating public policy has been defined as Conduct tending to injure
the public good or contravening an important societal interest.:'5 Courts have
long recognized, however, that the public policy of one generation might not
be the public policy of another.54 Due to the principle's fluctuating nature,
jurists have been unable to fashion a fixed rule for determining when conduct
violates public policy. 5 5 Although other jurisdictions used judicial discretion
to invoke the exception in wrongful discharge cases, Florida courts refused to
nullify voluntary contractual agreements on uncertain public policy grounds. 156
Instead, the judiciary deferred to the legislature to institute any doctrinal
change.157
149. See ECON. REP. OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 143 at 11 (in 1980 and 1981, manufacturing was one of Florida's slowest employment growth areas). But see supra text accompanying notes 168-70.
150. See FLORmA SrAaTSTICAL AsmAc'mr 1981, supra note 69, Table 6.55, at 166.
151. See, e.g., Servamerica, Inc. v. Rolfe, 318 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1975) (at-will
employee, who was discharged despite employer's previous assurance of promotion, had no
right to relief); Sher v. Shower Door Co. of Am., 197 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1967) (if
at-will relationship existed, fact that discharged employee was promised a share of profits on
certain sales, which he never received, did not alter the at-will rule). But see infra text accompanying notes 160-63, emphasizing that courts adhering to the public policy exception
successfully limited its application to clear violations of legislative mandates. Thus, employee
complaints based on private interest violations remain nonactionable.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 155-58.
153. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Beazley, 54 Fla. 311, 335, 45 So. 761, 786 (1907).
154. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). Justice Sutherland stated that given
the variable quality of public policy, it should be the basis of judicial determination only
with utmost circumspection unless it can be deduced from constitutional or statutory provisions. Id. at 306.
155. See Russell v. Martin, 88 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1956).
156. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980). For informative discussions of public policy vagueness, see First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n v. Washington Nat'1 Arena, 282 Md. 588, 386 A.2d 1216 (1978).
157. See supra note 126. See also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Beazley, 54 Fla. 311, 45
So. 761 (Fla. 1907). The Florida Supreme Court stated the legislature determines what is
best for the public good and provides for the public welfare through proper enactments.
Judges expound the law, as deduced from statutes, and the judiciary should not speculate as
to the best manner of promoting the community's welfare. Id. at 336, 45 So. at 786. Cf.
Kelsay v. Motorola, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). In Kelsay, the majority held an
employee's discharge following her claim for workers' compensation violated public policy,
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SUGGESTED APPROACH

The Florida Legislature has not acted to protect at-will employees because
such statutes might contravene the state's goal of bolstering an unstable economy. Florida's dependence on tourism subjects the state economy to dramatic
seasonal fluctuations.158 The legislature accordingly enacted liberal corporate
laws to minimize these economic fluctuations by encouraging manufacturers
to locate within the state.15 9 Due to this pro-management stance, the legislature
is unlikely to enact any general statutory law protecting at-will employees that
might deter incoming businesses. Thus, any exception to the at-will rule must
be judicially created.
The public policy exception is not as broad as recent Florida decisions indicate, as it does not encompass all discharges allegedly violating public policy.
Recognizing the need for flexibility in business decisions, courts refrain from
interfering in employment relationships in a way that would impair the exercise of managerial discretion. 60 Jurists distinguish dismissals transgressing a
clear public policy mandate, which give rise to a cause of action, from ordinary
and the court awarded compensatory damages. The dissent viewed the court's creation of a
civil remedy as an intrusion into the legislative field. The dissent stated, "it is not our function to engraft on a statute additions which we think the legislature logically might or should
have made." Id. at 190, 384 N.E.2d at 361 (Underwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941)).
158. Florida's tourism depends on the rest of the country's economic health as well as the
relative desirability of Florida's amenities, which generally attract more vacationers during
severe northern winters. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR 31 (1978).
159. Since 1979, Governor Graham has emphasized a primary goal of stimulating industrial growth in Florida. The overall legislative theme during the last two years emphasized
that Florida must "create the promotional vehicles to show industry that Florida is the best
possible state to locate or expand." See FINAL REPORT OF THE GovERNOR's TASK FORCE ON
ECONOMIC POLICY, ECONOMIC AGENDA FOR THE 1980's 12 (1980). The report referred to a major
industry that planned to relocate in Florida. Learning that necessary permits and licensing

would delay relocation for two years, the company relocated in another state where licensing
delays were less than 45 days. The task force stressed that Florida's economy could not afford
to lose other potential industries. Id. at 13.
Consequently, the legislature took numerous steps to attract new industries to the state.
Florida, for example, is the only State that adopted a wage law system for determining worker
compensation premiums. The system bases compensation for an injury on the difference

between worker earnings before the injury and the worker's earning capacity after the injury.
Thus, a Florida employee can bring suit only for the amount of actual damages. As a result
of the wage law system, the percentage of paid workers' compensation premiums declined

40% during the period of October, 1980 to March, 1982. Other recent legislative actions included various sales and ad valorem tax exemptions for corporations. In addition, the trucking industry was deregulated in 1980, to lower Florida transportation costs. Telephone interview with Randall Gunn, State of Florida Bureau of Industry Development, Mar. 11, 1982.

See also Symposium - Trucking Deregulation, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 843 (1980) (examination
of Florida's deregulated trucking industry).
160. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 474-75, 427 A.2d 385, 387
(1980) (employee discharged in retaliation for insisting that his employer comply with state
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was entitled to relief under public policy exception). See also
Mooney & Pinapank, Wrongful Discharge: A New Cause of Action, 54 CONN. B.J. 213 (1980)
(discussion of whether the Sheets decision gives employees too much latitude to sue employers
for public policy violations).
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employment disputes, which are not actionable. 8 1 Hence, Florida's adoption of
the public policy exception would not subject courts to unnecessary litigation.
Moreover, limiting the exception's application to clear public policy violations
avoids placing unreasonable restraints on employers. By invoking this narrow
limitation on employers' dismissal power, Florida courts would not hamper
1 2
the legislature's goal of attracting new industries to the state.
To determine whether a particular wrongful discharge claim warrants
judicial intervention, most courts applying the public policy exception analyze
the "substantiality"''1 3 of the policy involved. Courts utilize a cost-benefit
analysis to ascertain substantiality: the public policy exception applies only
where the benefit to society, achieved by protecting an employee's rights, clearly
outweighs the cost of limiting an employer's individual freedom.8 4 Under this
standard, courts routinely permit tort recovery if the dismissal violates public
policy embodied in statutory 65 or constitutional law.- 8 Rather than encroach
upon the legislature, courts yield to statutory expressions of public policy as a
basis for invoking the exception. The Petermann court, for example, derived
the community interest in obtaining accurate testimony concerning union activities from a state law prohibiting perjury. 167 The court found a clear public
policy from this statute that outweighed the employer's rights under the employment contract. Similarly, in Frampton, society's interest in providing fair
compensation to injured employees, as evidenced in the state's workers' com6
pensation statute, superseded the employer's common law discharge right. 8
Courts nevertheless recognized a need to limit the public policy exception
to prevent spurious litigation of wrongful discharge claims. 69 Alleged public

161. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 474, 427 A.2d 385, 889 (1980).
See also Note, Non-Statutory Causes of Action for an Employer's Termination of an "At Will"
Employment Relationship:A Possible Solution to the Economic Imbalance in the EmployerEmployee Relationship, 24 N.Y.L. Scn. L. REv. 743 (1979) (discusses courts' use of public
policy as a tool to balance competing interests in employment relationship).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
163. See Note, Guidelines for a Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Rule:
The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REv. 617, 623-30 (1981) (detailed discussion of
substantiality concept in the public policy context).
164. Id.
165. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va; 1978) (employee's
discharge in xetaliation for his efforts to require employer compliance with consumer credit
and protection laws violated clear public policy mandate).
166. See Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (employer, who
intentionally fired employee to prevent employee from obtaining pension rights, violated
public policy derived from state constitutional law protecting pension plans).
167. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P2d 25 (1959).
168. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). Cf. Sventko v. Kroger, 69 Mich. App. 644, 245
N.W.2d 151 (1976) (dismissal based on employee's filing of workers' compensation claim
violated public policy). But cf. Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1978) (court
upheld employee's dismissal for filing workers' compensation claim and expressly declined to
follow Frampton and Sventko).
169. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). The New
'Jersey Supreme Court recognized a wrongful discharge action must balance the interests of
the employee, the employer and the public. The court stated:
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policy violations generally are rejected where employees fail to show the reason
for dismissal directly infringes upon a specific statutory or constitutional provision. 170 Without legislative policy expression, 171 courts utilize the exception
only under compelling circumstances. In Nees, the Oregon Supreme Court
found society's interest in preserving the jury system sufficiently compelling to
invoke the public policy limitation. In that case, the court could not trace the
employee's protection from dismissal for serving jury duty to any precise
statute. 72 Instead, the court inferred a substantial public policy emanating
from general constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to jury trials and
from statutory laws governing jury duty. 73 Drawing upon these provisions, the
court concluded the public's interest in having its citizens comply with civic
17 4
obligations prevailed over the employer's discharge power.
Absent established legislative policy, employees seeking relief are held to a
stringent standard. Courts refuse to create a cause of action for discharge simply
because the employee's conduct is praiseworthy or confers some benefit on the
public." 5 Moreover, courts uniformly reject tort actions where the only issue
is the employee's personal interest. Employees fired for taking too much sick
leave,' 7 6 for attending night school,"'7 and for participating in a dispute over a
company's internal management system have been denied judicial relief." 8
[E]mployees have an interest in knowing they will not be discharged for exercising
their legal rights. Employers have an interest in knowing they can run their businesses as
they see fit as long as their conduct is consistent with public policy. The public has an
interest in employment stability and in discouraging frivolous lawsuits by dissatisfied
employees.
Id. at 64, 417 A.2d at 513.
170. See Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978).
In Lampe, a hospital nurse brought suit against her employer, who ordered her to reduce
the overtime worked by her nursing staff. After the nurse did not comply with this order,
because she felt reducing the staff would jeopardize patients' care, the hospital discharged her.
The nurse claimed the dismissal violated several state statutes regulating the nursing profession and protecting the public health. The court, however, ruled such general state statutes
did not create a public policy base for bringing a private cause of action. Id.
171. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Il. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
In Palmateer, an employee was dismissed for supplying a local law enforcement agency with
information that a fellow employee possibly violated the state criminal code and for planning
to testify at the employee's trial. Although no specific constitutional or statutory provision
required a citizen to actively take part in stopping crime, the court stated public policy
favored exposure of crime. Since effective implementation of that public policy depended
upon cooperation of citizens possessing such knowledge, the court invoked the public policy
exception. Id. at 1321, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
172. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
173. Id. at 218-19, 536 P.2d at 516.
174. Id. at 219, 536 P.2d at 517.
175. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 819 A.2d 174 (1974). In Geary, a
sales employee was fired for bypassing his immediate superior and reporting to higher officials
an unsafe product should be removed from the market. The employee sued his employer for
wrongful discharge, claiming good intentions. Since the employee failed to show a clear
legislative policy protecting his conduct, the court upheld the dismissal.
176. See Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979).
177. See Schroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977).
178. See Keneally v. Orgain, 87 Mont. 154. 606 P.2d 127 (1980).
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Florida's refusal to adopt the exception without a fixed public policy definition is tenuous, because Florida courts are familiar with the public policy concept. Jurists have long recognized under general contract law that an otherwise legally binding contract may be voided where the agreement's terms
contravene public policy."79 In applying this principle, courts found the state's
public policy in its constitution, statutes and judicial decisions.180 Using this
same standard, Florida courts should apply the tort-based public policy exception in unjust dismissal cases.
The Catania and DeMarco cases illustrate the delineation between public

policy violations and nonactionable employer conduct affecting workers' personal interests. In Catania, the airline employees claimed their dismissal violated Florida's right to work as embodied in statutory law. A81 The statute declared Florida's societal interest in providing all workers, union and non-union,
with equal labor opportunities 8 2 In Catania the employees failed to establish

a nexus between the reason for their dismissal and the legislative intent behind
the statute: they did not allege the dismissal related to union activity. The

employees, instead, asserted the right to work law prevented the employer from
firing them without cause.' 8 3 A tort action was improper because the dismissals
,affected only the employees' private interest in remaining employed.
Unlike Catania, the dismissal in DeMarco compromised a substantial, public
policy expressed in constitutional terms. 84 The state constitution defines legal
rights to which every person is entitled. 8 5 Specifically, the right of court access
secures individual rights against unconstitutional invasion by the state, government agencies and individuals. 8 6 The employee in DeMarco, however, was
clearly fired for exercising his right to seek legal redress of an injury. 8 7 Forced
to choose between his constitutional right and his livelihood, the employee

properly demonstrated the reason for dismissal directly contravened Florida's
public policy of guaranteeing court access. Upon showing this nexus between
179. See Wechsler v. Novak, 26 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1946) (contract to gain release of hotel
from U.S. Ari~ay and return it to civilian use during war was void as against public policy);
City 'of Leesburg v. Ware, 113 Fla. 760, 15 So. 87 (1934) (city bond trustees' purchase of
bonds from bank through the bank's secretary held contrary to public policy, where secretary
was also bank officer). See also Note, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 CoLuM. L. Rav. 679
(1935) (analysis of the relationship between public policy and contract theory).
180. See City of Leesburg v. Ware, 113 Fla. at 762, 153 So. at 89.
181. 381 So. 2d at 267.,
182. See supra note 127.
183. 381 So. 2d at 267.
184. See supra note 133.
185. See Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944) (invasion of right of privacy,
guaranteed, by state constitution, gave rise to tort, action). Cf. Smith v. Atlas Off-shore Boat
.Serv., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981). In Smith, a seaman filed a personal injury claim against
his employer for an injury sustained while working aboard the employer's vessel. The seaman
was told that unless he abandoned the claim, his employment would be terminated. The
seaman refused and was later fired. The court of appeals ruled Smith was entitled to damages
for retaliatory discharge. While the employer's discharge of the at-will employee was an
essentially lawful act, it could not be used to effectuate a result contrary to the purpose the
right was designed to protect. Id. at 1063.
186. See Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926).,.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
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public policy and private dismissal, an employee should be afforded relief
under the public policy exception.
CONCLUSION

Florida's judicial adoption of the public policy exception is long overdue.
Current employment conditions indicate individual workers lack bargaining
power to demand job security. 88 The vast majority of Florida workers are atwill employees; 8 9 therefore, there is a heightened need to protect these workers from possible abusive dismissal. In view of the legislature's effort to attract
new industries to the state, however, a statutory exception to the at-will rule is
not likely. Thus, the responsibility of adapting to current employment needs
falls to the judiciary.
Given the strict contours of the public policy exception, 190 Florida's judicial
reluctance to adopt the doctrine rests upon untenable grounds. By allowing
discharged employees a tort claim under the exception, other jurisdictions
have placed only narrow limitations on employers' discretionary firing power.
Requiring employees to establish a proper nexus between the reason for dismissal and a substantial societal concern ensures courts will limit the exception
to clear public policy violations. Where employees fail to show a substantial
violation of an important public interest, employers retain absolute contractual freedom.?91 If Florida's adoption of the public policy limitation is
based on this stringent standard of proof, it would only minimally affect at-willemployment relationships and would discourage unnecessary litigation.
Furthermore, by requiring employees to base wrongful discharge claims on
specific statutory and constitutional provisions, public policy determinations
would be defined by existing law. Florida courts, therefore, need not be concerned about encroaching on the legislature's domain. 9 2 Cases such as DeMarco
demonstrate Florida's need for the public policy exception, where the employer's reason for discharge clearly infringes upon a substantial public policy
mandate. 93 Continuing to uphold such dismissals under the guise of protecting
individual contractual freedom merely perpetuates retaliatory firings and encumbers employees' statutory and constitutional rights.
DEBRA GREENBERG
188. "With the rise of large corporations conducting specialized operations and employing relatively immobile workers who often have no other place to market their skills, recog-

nition that the employer and employee do not stand on equal footing is realistic." Palmateer
v. International Harvester Corp.. 85 111. 2d at 129, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 143-50.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 163-66.
191. See Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. App. 1979) (employee fired for reporting
superior who solicited kickbacks did not state a valid claim for wrongful discharge); Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (employee fired to prevent him
from exposing corporate misconduct did not show violation of a clear public policy); Chin v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 96 Misc. 2d 1070 (1978) (employee dismissed
after arrested and charged with driving a van into three police officers during a political
demonstration did not demonstrate public policy violation).
192. See Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963 (1912) (courts' duty to give effect to
the existing constitution).
193. See supra notes 165-66.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

21

